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UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules-The
Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport
of Goods
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY*
DEDICATION
It is a great honor to be asked to write for this Journal to pay
homage to Professor Nicholas J. Healy. I feel that I have known him
ever since I first opened the pages of Sprague and Healy's Cases on
Admiralty when I was a law student in 1957. I did not meet him,
however, until we were on opposite sides of a collision case in 1964,
The Ronda-Lucile Bloomfield, which was wandering through the
courts of New York, New Orleans, London and France. Thereafter,
I could observe his voyage from the Presidency of our Maritime Law
Association to his rightful place as wise counselor to the Comitd
Maritime International and generations of law students. I am most
grateful to Jack McMahon for the opportunity to contribute to this
Festschrift to commemorate the ten years of faithful stewardship of
this Journal by Professor Healy and his long and distinguished career
as an admiralty lawyer.
INTRODUCTION
The Hamburg Rules will come into force on November 1, 1992.
This article considers the allocation of risks-who pays for damage
done to cargo during the movement of the goods by an industry which
continues to be in trouble because of too many ships and not enough
cargoes. No international organization can tell governments not to
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author was United States
Representative and Chairman of Delegation at the Hamburg Rules Conference in 1978. He
previously attended all sessions of UNCITRAL and UNCTAD in preparation of the Hamburg
Rules. This article is based upon a paper presented at the Third UNCITRAL Symposium on
International Trade Law at Vienna, Austria, May 22-26, 1989. The views expressed herein are
those of the author and not the United States government.
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build new ships as long as shipyards and their workers are desperate
for skilled employment; and, no international organization can tell
governments to scrap old ships and replace them with more efficient
vessels which will cost jobs (or produce "redundancies," in the
euphemism of economists). The work of the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") on the risk allocation
problem began at a time when IMCO had no jurisdiction over the
subject; IMCO having concentrated on the operational rather than the
business aspects of the maritime industry.
At the heart of the risk allocation problem is the economic conflict
between the cargo owning interests (seller/shipper, buyer/consignee
and cargo insurers) and the ship owning interests (operators, char-
terers, the P&I Clubs and the Hull insurers). This has never been a
North-South confrontation nor an East-West ideological skirmish. In
fact, some nations are cargo owning, some nations are ship owning,
but most nations are both.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Legal recognition of this economic conflict between cargo owners
and shipowners did not come until about the middle of the nineteenth
century with the beginning of the age of steam propulsion and iron
ships. What had disappeared together with wooden sailing ships were
town and family based operations where the cargoes were owned at
least in part by the shipowner himself and the ships were partly
owned by the owners of cargoes. Theory and reality united in the
description of a voyage as a common venture and the shipment of
cargoes as a joint venture of cargo owners and shipowners. 2 In even
earlier times, the common venture idea was illustrated by the
presence on board the vessel of the "Super Cargo," representative of
the cargo owners to look after the goods and arrange for their sale.
Respecting the nature of the cargoes, it must be remembered that
1IMCO, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, a specialized agency of
the United Nations (UN Charter, Art. 57) was established by its own constitutive charter, 9
U.S.T. 621, TIAS No. 4044, 298 U.N.T.S. 48 (1948), which did not become effective until 1958.
The original charter has been amended seven times, most importantly by the 1975 Amendments
CTIAS No. 10374) effective May 22, 1982, under which the name of the organization became the
International Maritime Organization (IMO).
2See A. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
15 (1977), describing the "merchant" in the late 18th and early 19th centuries as the grand
distributor of the economy, acting as exporter, wholesaler, importer, retailer, shipowner,
banker and insurer. By the 1840s, however, specialized enterprises took over each function.
See generally, R. Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860 (1939).
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large manufacturing plants were yet to be built, and there was not yet
demand for bulk cargoes except in wartime. Available legal treatises
in the U.S. and U.K. barely mentioned the problem of cargo damage
at all3 and the only available insurance was in the form of the
all-purpose marine insurance policies originating with Lloyd's.
4
A key distinction was becoming important at about this time, the
distinction between common or public carriage and private carriage.
Respecting private carriage, by which is meant some type of charter
relationship, the private carrier owed a duty of care under the
circumstances, but the parties were free to alter the allocation of risks
by provisions negotiated in the charter party for use of the vessel.
5
Respecting both common and private carriage, the shipowner
warranted the seaworthiness of his vessel at all times and careful
stowage and careful carriage of the cargo.
6
Cargo insurers did not usually exercise their subrogation rights
against shipowners or their insurers until after the mid-nineteenth
century. The institution of cargo insurance developed gradually in the
mid-nineteenth century using the same form of Lloyd's insurance
policy as was already being used for the vessel's hull insurance.
7
The recognition of the need for other insurance protection for
shipowners appeared with the organization of the Shipowners' Mu-
3See A. Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil Law and of the Law of Admiralty
(Dublin 1797; 2d ed., London 1802; American edition New York, 1840), and H. Flanders,
Treatise on Maritime Law (Boston, 1852).
4Lloyd's Coffeeshop, first mentioned in the press in the 1680's became a meeting place for
merchants (note 2 supra) where underwriting by "private and particular persons" (rather than
the two corporations with official monopolies) could take place. Today, as in the eighteenth
century, the corporation of Lloyd's does not write insurance policies but provides the location
and support services for the underwriting members. See A. Parks, 1 The Law and Practice of
Marine Insurance and Average 8-10 (1974).
5Charter parties are assumed to have been negotiated at arms' length by shipowners and
charterers having equal bargaining power. See generally, Work v. Leathers, 97 U.S. 379 (1878);
The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124 (1895) and The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1 (1903).
Public or common carriage under bills of lading has been the subject of public policy at least
since the mid-nineteenth century. Carrier liability for cargo damage (loss of a crate containing
$18,000 in silver and gold coins) resulting from a disastrous fire at sea was prominently
advertised after New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants' Bank (The Lexington), 47 U.S. 344
(1848). Arrest in rem for cargo damage was authorized in Bulkeley v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton
Co., 65 U.S. 386 (1860).
6See The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199 (1894) and The Silvia, 171 U.S. 462 (1898). Cf.
The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. 7 (1858). See generally, Crutcher, The Ocean Bill of
Lading-A Study in Fossilization, 45 Tul. L. Rev. 697 (1971).
7The single maritime risks policy was adopted by Lloyd's in 1779. See A. Parks, supra note
4, at 3.
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tual Protection Society in England in 1855,8 but insurance coverage
was not prevalent for cargo damage claims for another twenty years
until the first modem P&I Club, the Steamship Owners' Mutual
Protection and Indemnity Association, was formed in 1874.9
It is obvious that shipowners have always been very well orga-
nized. It is also obvious that shippers have not been well organized
and it was not until 1984 that the danger of antitrust liability was
partially removed from them in the United States. l0 Beginning in
1874, another development protective of shipowners came into
existence, the conference system for liner shipping services.11 The
essence of the conference system is no competition as to rates.
Conference anti-competitive activities may come within an exemp-
tion to the antitrust laws where the Federal Maritime Commission has
authorized the underlying agreement. 12
One of the principal subjects of discussion in these early "confer-
ences" was the bill of lading. Uniformity of bill of lading terms was
desirable so that there would be no competitive differences between
the duties owed to cargo owners by shipowners servicing the same
routes. A notable effort in 1882 produced the Conference Form Model
Bill of Lading at Liverpool.13 This bill of lading introduced the idea of
unit limitation, that is, the maximum liability of shipowners per
package, by which was meant boxes, barrels, bales, bags and drums,
would be £ 100, a round figure suggested without reference to any
empirical data. This model bill of lading modified shipowners' obli-
gations by providing a long list of specific causes of loss (drawn from
shipowners' bills of lading) for which the shipowner would not be
liable.
8Birch-Reynardson, The History and Development of P&I Insurance: The British Scene, 43
Tul. L. Rev. 457 (1969), and Kipp, The History and Development of P&I Insurance: The
American Scene, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 475 (1969).
9See Cabaud, Cargo Insurance, 45 Tul. L. Rev. 988 (1971).
1tohe 1984 Shipping Act, Pub. L. 98-595 § 3(a)(1), 98 Stat. 3132, codified in 46 U.S.C.
801-841.
nD. Marx, International Shipping Cartels (1953), and B. Deakin, Shipping Conferences
(1973).
12Despite the clear prohibition of anticompetitive agreements in the 1890 Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1988), the 1916 Shipping Act provides an exemption for anti-competitive
agreements filed with the Federal Maritime Commission and approved by it. 46 U.S.C. 814 (4th
paragraph) (1988). See generally, Gardner, Steamship Conferences and the Shipping Act, 1916,
35 Tul. L. Rev. 129 (1960).
13Conference Form Model Bill of Lading, 1882. A. Knauth, The American Law of Ocean
Bills of Lading 118-31 (4th ed. 1953). Before the birth of the Comit6 Maritime International in
1897, many discussions of maritime problems were conducted under the auspices of the
International Law Association, organized in 1873, thus the "Conference" herein does not refer
to shipowner cartels, but rather to a meeting of the International Law Association.
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The Conference Model bill of lading was amended by the New
York Produce Exchange, an organization where shipper viewpoints
were prominent, and versions of it were endorsed in 1883, 1884 and
1889.14
The defense of negligent navigation arose in the period 1882-1889
from P&I Clubs which insisted that a clause relieving the shipowner
from liability for any loss due to negligent navigation by his employ-
ees be inserted into the bills of lading issued by all shipowners whose
vessels were entered in the same club. 15 ,This concept of negligence as
a defense was once prevalent with respect to other transportation
modes, but has disappeared everywhere except in ocean shipping. 16
THE HARTER ACT (1893)
The Harter Actl 7 was the first legislation anywhere to address the
question of risk allocation for cargo damage. The U.S. Congress was
not blind to the decline of the U.S. merchant marine, but the
congressional response to the problem had traditionally been the
subsidy where the opportunities for corruption were limitless.18
Legislation to protect the interests of the United States as a cargo
owning, rather than a shipowning, nation was introduced in the fall of
1892 by Congressman Michael Harter of Ohio, being passed by the
House of Representatives on December 15, 1892.19 It was heavily
amended in the Senate where the famous "compromise" was add-
14A. Knauth, supra note 13, at 119.
"The broader and more general term "negligent navigation" gradually replaced earlier
"accidents of navigation" and "errors of mariner's judgment." By 1893, Congress used the
expression "errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel," 46 U.S.C. 192 (1988).
16The provisions of the 1929 Warsaw Convention for the negligent navigation defense in
shippers' cargo damage claims against air carriers (Art. 20(2)) was removed by the Hague
Protocol of 1956, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (Article X).
There is no equivalent of the "negligent navigation" defense in either the 1956 international
road convention (CMR), 399 U.N.T.S. 190, or the 1952 rail convention (CIM), 241 U.N.T.S.
336. There is a new rail convention (COTIF, 1980) which contains CIM as an appendix. The
domestic statute applicable to road and rail, the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11707
(1988), has no equivalent of the "negligent navigation" defense.
1746 U.S.C. 190-96 (1988). Despite ninety-eight years of litigation and interpretation it is still
important to consider the initial understanding of the legislation as set out at 24 Cong. Rec. 1180
(1893) and in Green, The Harter Act, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 157 (1904), and in Wheeler, The Harter
Act: Recent Legislation in the United States Respecting Bills of Lading, 33 Am. L. Rev. 801
(1899).
18M. McKee, The Ship Subsidy Question in American Politics, Smith College Studies in
History VIII (1922-23).
19H.R. 9176, 52nd Cong. Ist Sess. (1892). See generally, 1. Hutchins, The American
Maritime Industries and Public Policy 1789-1914: An Economic History (1941).
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ed.20 Under the Harter Act compromise, found in Section 3 of the
statute, if the shipowner used due diligence to make his vessel
seaworthy-the, time for this due diligence not being specified-the
shipowner would not be liable for damages due to negligent naviga-
tion or management of the ship. 2'
Dangers of the sea, seizures under legal process, deviation to save
life or property, and the traditional defenses of Act of God, Act of the
Public Enemy, Inherent Vice of the Cargo and Faults of the Shipper
were also preserved.22 Apparently, with "negligent navigation," the
drafters had in mind the idea of immunizing the owners only from
liability for catastrophic losses in collisions or groundings, but they
used language which could easily be expanded to include all acts of
seamanship occurring on a vessel.
The "quid pro quo" in the compromise were two provisions:
Section One outlawed bill of lading clauses which relieved the
shipowner from liability for loss or damage due to negligent loading,
stowage, custody, care or proper delivery; 23 Section Two outlawed
clauses which lessened the shipowner's duty to furnish a seaworthy
vessel or carefully stow and deliver the cargo.U
THE HAGUE RULES (1921), AND COGSA (1936)
The traditional maritime states of Europe, all shipowning nations,
feared the spread of national legislative solutions like the Harter Act
on the risk of loss problem.75 Thus, after the successful conclusion of
the new international rules on collision damages and salvage in
1910,26 the Comit6 Maritime International prepared to take up the
2
°See A. Knauth, supra note 13, at 120-3.
2146 U.S.C. 192 (1988). See The Carib Prince, 170 U.S. 655 (1898), which would seemingly
permit the carrier to provide in the bill of lading that due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy
in all respects was to be measured at the time "before and at the beginning of the voyage."
246 U.S.C. 192. It has been assumed that due diligence to render the vessel seaworthy as
a pre-condition did not apply to these general maritime law defenses, but there is no clear
holding.
2346 U.S.C. 190 (1988).
2446 U.S.C. 191 (1988).
25Legislation in exporting dominions of what was to become the British Commonwealth of
Nations copied much of the policy and language of the Harter Act, as in New Zealand's
Shipping and Seamen Act of 1903, Australia's Sea Carriage of Goods Act of 1904, and Canada's
Water Carriage of Goods Act of 1910. See A. Knauth, supra note 13, at 122-3.
26Intemational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to
Collisions Between Vessels, 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 3-2 (7th ed. 1990), and
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Assistance and
Salvage at Sea, 37 Stat. 1658, T.S. No. 576. For a study tying the high seas collision problem
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subject of the allocation of risk of loss between carrier and cargo by
way of an international convention which would regulate the ocean
bill of lading.
The CMI's work of international harmonization was suspended
during the First World War (1914-1918) which had caused great
losses to international shipping. After the war, rules based in part on
the compromises contained in the United States Harter Act formed
the basis for the ILA's Hague Conference of September, 1921, at
which the Hague Rules were adopted for voluntary inclusion in bills
of lading to be offered to cargo owners by shipowners; shippers would
have no choice if all owners offered the same rules.27
The "voluntary" Hague Rules system would not work without
participation of all cariers and the full cooperation of shippers in a
time of maritime industry depression, so the "mandatory" Hague
Rules of 1924 were drafted after two further sessions in 1922 and 1923
and the conclusion of the Diplomatic Conference of August, 1924, in
Brussels. 28 Despite the widespread agreement in 1924 in the maritime
industry concerning the need for this international convention, it did
not come into force until 1931, one year after the deposit of ratifica-
tions by four states: the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and
Hungary.
Forty-two states have now taken the formal steps to become
contracting parties to the Hague Rules; 12 by ratification and 30 by
accession;29 uncertainty is caused by former colonial powers having
ratified the Hague Rules on behalf of colonies, now independent. 30
to the development of the CMI, see, Sweeney, Proportional Fault in Both to Blame Collisions,
in Studi in Onore di Giorgio Berlingieri 549 (Sp. ed. II Diritto Marrittimo 1964). See also, Note,
Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure of the Brussels Conventions to Achieve
International Agreement on Collision Liability, Liens and Mortgages, 64 Yale L.J. 878 (1955),
and Berlingieri, The Work of the Comit6 Maritime International: Past, Present and Future, 57
Tul. L. Rev. 1260 (1983).
27See generally, R. Colinvaux, The Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, 1924, and A. Knauth,
supra note 13, at 125-128.
28lnternational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155.
29Comitd Maritime International, Yearbook (1989-1990). The United States became the
eighth state to adhere to the Hague Rules, but the deposit of ratification occurred in June, 1937
after Congress enacted the domestic statute, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315, in 1936.
30 1n 1930 Great Britain deposited ratifications in the name of Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados,
British Honduras (now Belize), Cyprus, Dominica, FUi, Gambia, Grenada, British Cameroons
(now Cameroun), British Guiana (now Guyana), Jamaica, Kenya, Solomon Islands (now
Kiribati), Malaysia, Nigeria, Palestine, Borneo (now Sabah), Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, British Somaliland (now Somalia), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), St. Kitts-Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, The Ellice Islands (now Tuvalu),
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While the Hague Rules have been successful in dealing with many
problems, deterioration of essential legal uniformity began rapidly in
the worldwide depression of 1929-1939 with respect to a key provi-
sion, the unit limitation of liability fixed at £100 in gold per package in
the treaty,3' or $500 per package in COGSA.32 Already under attack
by inflation and devaluation, the situation became even more critical
with the technological innovations of containerized transport. 33
Although the 1924 Convention (or Hague Rules) brought up to date
a number of problems in maritime law left over from the days of sail
and the wartime merchant fleets, the core of the 1924 Convention-
the amount of limitation of liability per unit-£l00 gold in the Hague
Rules or $500 U.S. in COGSA-has deteriorated to such an extent
that it is impossible today for shipowners and their insurers to predict
with any degree of accuracy what the total amount of exposure will be
as a result of a disaster involving damage to ship and cargo. The
insurers must first know where litigation is likely to take place and
what currencies and methods of fixing the unit limit are to be used
before being able to approximate a guess on liability exposures.
Forum shopping by cargo interests and shipowner interests (through
bill of lading clauses) has become an essential skill for the maritime
industry. 34 It is not a fair criticism of the Hague Rules that they did
not foresee worldwide inflation and the container revolution, but that
does not mean that those problems can never be addressed and
corrected.
Another problem of the Hague Rules was the very narrow docu-
mentary reach of the convention-only the bill of lading; 35 and the
very narrow geographic scope of the convention-"tackle-to-tack-
Hong Kong, Falkland Islands, Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands. Subsequently
Portugal and Australia ratified for colonies. France specifically did not.31See Art. IV(5) and X.
3246 U.S.C. 1304(5).
33See Bannister, Containerization and Marine Insurance, 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 463 (1974),
and Bissell, The Operational Realities of Containerization and Their Effect on the Package
Limitation and the On-Deck Prohibition: Review and Suggestions, 45 Tul. L. Rev. 902 (1971).
34See W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 532-3 (2d. ed. 1978) for a table of per package
limitations in 29 countries.
In Petition of Bloomfield Steamship Co., 422 F.2d 728, 736, 1970 AMC 521 (2d Cir. 1970),
Judge Palmieri commented, "The owners of ships moving in international trade and colliding in
international waters may well expect to be involved in legal proceedings in more than one
country. Forum Shopping in this context is not a term of opprobrium but a way of life and each
party seeks what appears to be the best legal haven."
3s46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1988), "Every bill of lading or similar document of title which is evidence
of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea ... shall have effect subject to the provisions of
this chapter." See note 105 infra.
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le"36--which leaves a legal vacuum in many countries before and
after the tackle-to-tackle period, so that very often no responsible
party can be held liable for damage to cargo during such periods
although the carrier had "charge" of the cargo before and after the
voyage.
THE VISBY AMENDMENTS (1967-8)
Dissatisfaction of the traditional maritime states with the Hague
Rules led to proposed changes by the CMI, which came to be called
the "Visby Amendments." 37 The Belgian Government convened a
diplomatic conference to consider these amendments in May, 1967,
and an adjourned session in February, 1968. The Brussels Protocol of
Amendments to the Hague Rules was finally signed on February 23,
1968. The Protocol came into force with the tenth instrument of
ratification on June 23, 1977.38 In the protocol the key issue, the
amount and method of fixing the unit limitation of liability, was
addressed. 39 The unit limitation amount was to be determined by
reference to gold (Poincare Francs). Gold, however, has not provided
a mechanism to adjust to the effects of worldwide persistent inflation.
The amount of unit limitation in the 1968 Protocol was 30 Francs
Poincard per kilogramme (U.S. $.90 per pound) and 10,000 Francs
Poincard per package (U.S. $662). 40 The issue today in a number of
countries, both with respect to the Hague Rules and Visby Amend-
ments and the other transportation law conventions, is whether the
number of gold francs is convertible into national currency on the
basis of the market value of gold. Thus, Courts in Australia and the
United Kingdom (interpretation applicable to Kenya) 41 have recently
3646 U.S.C. § 1301(e) "the period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time
when they are discharged from the ship." This is popularly known as the "tackle to tackle"
rule. Cf. Hamburg Rules Art. 4, Carrier responsibility while the goods are in his charge.
37 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of
Law Relating to Bills of Lading, 6 Benedict on Admiralty Doc. No. 1-2 (1990).38CMI Documentation, supra note 29.39See note 37, supra, Article 2, replacing Hague Rules Art. IV(5). Visby adds an alternative
method of unit limitation by weight as well as package.40M.
41The market value of gold cases are, The Rosa S, [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 574 (Adm. 1988),
and Brown Boveri (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Baltic Shipping Co. (S.C.N.S.W. July 31, 1986), see
4 Lloyds Mar. L. Newsletter No. 4 at 1.
In the context of air law, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the market value of gold as
the basis for converting the gold francs of the Warsaw Convention into dollars. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
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ruled that £100 sterling in gold in the Hague Rules must be translated
into local currency in terms of the market value of gold.
In 1979, the Belgian Government called another diplomatic confer-
ence to add a protocol to the 1968 Protocol-that is, to express the
amount of unit limitation of carrier liability in terms of the artificial
unit of the International Monetary Fund, the "Special Drawing
Right" ("SDR"). The amounts chosen were 2 SDR's (or $2.62) per
kilogramme, or 667 SDR's (or $873) per package, whichever is
greater.42 This protocol came into force in 1984. 43
There is no conflict between the actual provisions of the Visby
Amendments and the 1978 U.N. Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea ("Hamburg Rules"), since the provisions of Visby are
incorporated in Hamburg. The conflict comes from the retention in
the Visby Amendments of the negligent navigation and management
defenses, the narrower period of carrier responsibility and the
limitation to bills of lading.
THE HAMBURG RULES (1978)
The Hamburg Rules are a successful product of the science of
comparative law and over eight years of research and study. Com-
promise and hard bargaining were also part of the process in
UNCITRAL, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) and the diplomatic conference. The Hamburg Rules
illustrate the process of growth in international legislation on mer-
chant shipping, providing a modern, sophisticated convention dealing
in one document with most of the legal problems of cargo damage
now encountered in the relations between cargo owning interests and
their insurers and vessel owning interests and their insurers.
At about the time the CMI completed work on the Visby Amend-
ments in 1968, the United Nations began to extend its activities into
merchant shipping. In UNCTAD,"4 organized in 1964, there was
considerable dissatisfaction with the traditional maritime law prevail-
ing among the "colonialist" powers. This dissatisfaction stemmed
from the belief that the operation of traditional maritime law (along
with other aspects of international trade law) continued to impair the
balance of payment position of developing states so as to contribute
42The 1979 Protocol to the 1968 Visby Amendments usually called the "S.D.R. Protocol" is
found in 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 1-2A.
43CM1 Yearbook, supra note 29.
44UNCTAD was established under G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) at 1,
U.N. Doc. A15815.
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to continued poverty and under-development in an industrial age. In
the field of traditional maritime law, this dissatisfaction is clearly
spelled out in the UNCTAD Secretariat Report on Bills of Lading of
14 December 1970. 45
At the First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
in Geneva, March 23 to June 16, 1964, Special Principle XII was
agreed to, as follows:
All countries should cooperate in devising measures to help developing
countries build up maritime and other means of transport for their
economic development, to ensure the unhindered use of international
transport facilities, the improvement of terms of freight and insurance
for the developing countries, and to promote tourism in these countries
in order to increase their earnings and reduce their expenditure on
invisible tradeA6
The second UNCTAD Conference at New Delhi, February 1 to
March 29, 1968, adopted ten resolutions relating to shipping, among
which was a resolution for the creation of a Working Group on
International Shipping Legislation. 47 Pursuant to these decisions, the
UNCTAD Working Group was established in December, 1969, with
first priority given to a study of bills of lading. 48
At its 1971 session, the UNCTAD Working Group had before it the
lengthy study of problems in bills of lading and was preparing to go
ahead with the work, however, with the emergence of UNCITRAL49
capability in this vital area of international trade and the continued
hostility of developed states to UNCTAD activity in maritime law, it
was considered prudent to shift the legal questions arising out of bills
of lading to the expertise of UNCITRAL0 while UNCTAD's activ-
ities in the area of shipping would be concentrated on economic
45UNCTAD Report, Doc. No. TDIBIC.4JISL/6 of 14 Dec. 1970. See also UNCTAD,
Committee on International Shipping Legislation, UN Doc. TDIB/289, and Hellawell, Less
Developed Countries and Developed Countries' Law: Problems From the Law of Admiralty, 7
Col. J. Transnat. L. 203 (1968).
461964 U.N.Y.B. 195.
471968 U.N.Y.B. 375.
481969 U.N.Y.B. 336-8.49UNCITRAL, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, was estab-
lished by G.A. Res. 2205, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 99, U.N. Doec. A/63/6. The
Commission is made up of 36 member states, elected by the General Assembly on the basis of
legal systems and geographic regions.
Orransfer of the politically sensitive issue was accomplished by General Assembly
Resolution, U.N. GA Res. 2421 (XXIII). Merchant shipping became a priority item for
UNCITRAL in 1969, and after further discussions the 21 member state Working Group was
established. 1971 U.N.Y.B. 595.
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issues such as the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, Combined
(or Multi-modal) Transport of Goods,51 Merchant Marine Develop-
ment, Port Development, and Freight Rates. In retrospect, the
foresight of this decision has been proven in that UNCITRAL
produced a draft convention free of the political and economic
discords which sometimes burden the decision-making process of
UNCTAD.
Looking back on the twelve years since the diplomatic conference,
it is now possible to isolate the reasons for the hesitancy of maritime
powers to adopt the Hamburg Rules, but at the time the work in
UNCITRAL was widely approved as the dawn of a new era of
cooperation in international trade. The debate in the United States
and other developed states has rightly or wrongly centered on the
issue of the retention of the negligent navigation defense. The
position of the United States in UNCITRAL and at Hamburg for the
diplomatic conference and earlier meetings of UNCITRAL on this
issue is relevant. The instructions of the Department of State,
prepared after lengthy consultations in the Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law, stressed that the goal of the
negotiations should not be new and unusual liabilities on carriers, but
that the provisions of the Harter Act of 1893 and the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act of 1936 should not be made more onerous for
shippers. This view of the State Department also noted how United
States' courts had interpreted the negligent navigation defense to
restrict its uses in single ship disasters 52 and how United States'
courts had used the rules on joint and several liability in collision
cases to undermine the negligent navigation defense in collision
cases. 53 Finally, United States' delegates were aware of the difficulty
51The 1980 multi-modal convention is not yet in force. It requires 30 ratifications to bring it
into force. See U.N. Doc. TD/MT/CONF/16, and Driscoll and Larsen, The Convention on the
International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 193 (1982).
-Limitations on the negligent navigation and management defenses because of an overriding
duty to care for the cargo originated in Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900). Under the
doctrine of that case, involving change of trim causing wet sugar to drain into a cargo of raw
wool, the change of trim was merely incidental to navigation but was essential to care for the
cargo. See generally, Greenwood, Problems of Negligence in Loading, Stowage, Custody, Care
and Delivery of Cargo: Errors in Management and Navigation; Due Diligence to Make
Seaworthy, 45 Tul. L. Rev. 790 (1971), and Villareal, Carrier's Responsibility to Cargo and
Cargo's to Carrier, 45 Tul. L. Rev. 770 (1971).
53Joint and several liability of both shipowners in a mutual fault collision descends from The
Alabama and The Gamecock, 92 U.S. 695 (1875), and The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876). The
principles were applied to produce the indirect liability of carriers to their own cargo by reason
of joint and several liability and collision damage rules in The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540
(1899). Attempts to circumvent this indirect liability through the "Both to Blame" Collision
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which retention of the negligent navigation defense would create in
multimodal shipping.
While the Hamburg negotiating process led to difficult compro-
mises, it could never become a forum for commercial resolution of all
the problems of risk allocation because of the rigid attitude of
shipowning states, i.e., no changes in the Hague-Visby system were
acceptable. Developing states, on the other hand, required that there
be changes in international trade, although these same states were
very pragmatic as to exactly what had to change. The Hamburg Rules
were not the product of developing states, and could never have been
achieved without the cooperation of the developed states: Australia,
Canada, France, Norway and the United States.
At the second session of UNCITRAL in March 1969, the subject of
international shipping legislation was added to UNCITRAL's priority
items,54 and in 1971, the objections of a great many interests were
satisfied by the enlargement of the Working Group on International
Legislation on Shipping to twenty-one members from the original
seven in order to assure proper representation to commercial inter-
ests and legal systems as well as regional groupings. This working
group thereafter held six substantive sessions from January 1972 to
February 1975 during which time the UNCITRAL Draft Convention
on Carriage of Goods by Sea was prepared. The story of the drafting
will not be repeated as it has been described in detail in earlier articles
in this Journal.5 -
The order in which the substantive parts of the UNCITRAL Draft
Text were developed is relevant to a consideration of the priorities
assigned to problems of merchant shipping (the list cites the relevant
articles of the Hamburg Rules):
a. The before and after the voyage problem, Hamburg Rules Art.
4 (1972).
Clause were held to violate public policy in United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 343 U.S.
236 (1952).
'U.N. Doc. AICN. 9/SER. A/1970, in I UNCITRAL Y.B. 110 (1968-70).
55Sweeney, The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea: Part 1, 7 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 69; Part 2, 7 . Mar. L. & Com. 327; Part 3, 7 J. Mar. L. & Com. 487; Part 4,
7 J. Mar. L. & Com. 615 (1975-1976); and Part 5, 8 J. Mar. L. & Com. 167 (1977).
UNCITRAL Commission action on these draft articles can be found in the UNCITRAL
Yearbooks, as follows: I UNCITRAL Y.B. paras. 114-133; 2 UNCITRAL Y.B. paras.
157-166; 3 UNCITRAL Y.B. paras. 44-51; 4 UNCITRAL Y.B. paras. 46-61; 5 UNCITRAL
Y.B. paras. 38-53; 6 UNCITRAL Y.B. paras. 64-77.
See also, The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (S. Mankabady ed. 1978)
(hereinafter The Hamburg Rules).
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b. Deck Cargo and Live Animals, Hamburg Rules Arts. 1(5) and
9 (1972 and 1974).
c. Jurisdiction-judicial and arbitral, Hamburg Rules Arts. 21 and
22 (1972, 1974 and 1975).
d. Fault, Hamburg Rules Art. 5 (1972, 1974 and 1975).
e. Unit Limitation of Liability, Hamburg Rules Art. 6 (la) (1973).
f. The Himalaya clause, Hamburg Rules Arts. 7(2) and 8(2) (1973).
g. Transshipment, Hamburg Rules Arts. 10 and 11 (1973).
h. Time Bar, Hamburg Rules Art. 20 (1973).
i. Delay, Hamburg Rules Arts. 6(lb) and 5(2) (1974 and 1975).
j. Documentary Scope, Hamburg Rules Art. 2 (1974).
k. Definitions, Hamburg Rules Art. 1 (1974).
1. Contents of the Bill of Lading, Hamburg Rules Arts. 15 and 16
(1974).
m. Letters of Guarantee, Hamburg Rules Art. 17 (1974).
n. Dangerous Goods, Hamburg Rules Art. 13 (1975).
o. Notice of Loss, Hamburg Rules Art. 19 (1975).
p. Derogations, Hamburg Rules Arts. 23-25 (1975).
A Second Reading of the complete text by the Working Group took
place in February, 1975.56 Of great importance was the question,
"Should there be a new convention?" or "Should the work of UNCI-
TRAL be cast in the form of a Protocol to the Hague Rules of 1924, with
the Visby Amendments as partial correctives?" These discussions often
mentioned the unsatisfactory situation of the Warsaw ConventionS7
which, shortly before, had been revised in a most complex formula with
four protocols to accommodate the signatories to the 1929 Convention
without protocols and then to accommodate the signatories to the 1956
Hague Protocol and the 1971 Guatemala Protocol.58 Not without mis-
givings, it was decided to adhere to the Working Group decision and
initiate an entirely new Convention under United Nations auspices with
the name, "United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by
Sea," rather than to add another protocol to the Hague Rules of 1924.
During this Second Reading a number of controversial issues were
extensively reviewed. In light of the Hamburg Plenary of the CMI in
April 197459 which had proposed the elimination of the defense of
56The 1975 UNCITRAL Second Reading of the entire text is found in U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/105.
5The Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 371.58The Montreal Protocols of Sept. 25, 1975 are found at III International Transport Treaties,
117-33.59C.M.I. Plenary, 1974, Hamburg (30th Conference), MLA Doc. No. 584, at 6269-6280.
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negligent management of the ship but the retention of the defense of
negligent navigation, the question was considered for the third time
and again the decision went against both negligent navigation and
management. Another review of the proposal to eliminate the pack-
age method of unit limitation in favor of the limitation amount to be
fixed by weight alone did not change the outcome: the dual method of
unit limitation would continue.
After the completion of the legislative drafting, the 1975 text of the
Draft Convention was submitted to all governments and interested
international organizations for comments. These comments, com-
piled and analyzed by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, provided a useful
preparation for the four week diplomatic conference after the meeting
of the entire Commission (Plenary Meeting) which took place in
April-May, 1976. 6o
Before the UNCITRAL Plenary, however, a bifurcated review of
the UNCITRAL draft text by UNCTAD's Working Group on Inter-
national Shipping Legislation began at Geneva in January, 1976.61
The economic implications of the new text were considered in
principle and approved, although no economic research similar to
that which the United States would employ in the Hamburg Confer-
ence had been done. The cumbersome "group" structure of
UNCTAD perhaps hindered the exchange of policy arguments in that
there were more serious disagreements within Group B (Western
Europe and Others) than there were between the groups. A hasty
textual review produced a list of proposals to change the draft text at
the forthcoming UNCITRAL Plenary; UNCTAD having reserved the
option to review the completed work of UNCITRAL before making
a recommendation to the General Assembly.
Final approval by UNCTAD of the UNCITRAL Plenary's draft
convention was obtained in July, 1976.62 The draft convention was
6OSee The Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Carriage of Goods by Sea,
March 31, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 608 (1978), and United Nations Conference on the Carriage of Goods
by Sea, Official Records (1981), UN Doc. No. A/Conf. 89/14 (hereinafter Official Records). The
1976 UNC1TRAL Plenary Report to the General Assembly is in U.N. Doc. A/31/17 at 57-160.
The draft text can be found in the Official Records, at 4-10. The analysis of governmental
comments can be found in Official Records, at 38-70.
61UNCTAD Working Group on International Shipping Legislation, U.N. Doc. TDIBIC.41
ISL/21 (Jan. 16, 1976). See also UNCTAD Secretariat Report on the UNCITRAL Draft in
TD/B/C.4/ISLJ19.
62UNCTAD Working Group on International Shipping Legislation, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/
ISLJ25 (July 30, 1976). After the Diplomatic Conference the end product was approved by the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee at its meeting in Doha, Qatar in 1979, holding that
the new convention was a suitable contribution to the New International Economic Order.
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considered and debated in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General
Assembly in November 1976 and endorsed by the General Assembly
when, by its resolution of 16 December 1976, the General Assembly
convened the Conference of Plenipotentiaries to consider it.63
The fact that there was an extensive text, prepared over a long
period at great expense and already riddled with delicate compro-
mises meant that it would be very difficult to introduce substantive
changes in the text at the Hamburg Conference, while purely drafting
changes were readily accomplished, although very often some of the
alleged drafting improvements were substantive in nature. Thus,
during the deliberations in Committee One, there were 263 amend-
ments proposed to the various substantive articles; 39 of 263 were
adopted, therefore roughly 85% of the proposed amendments were
rejected in favor of the established text.64
During the preparation for the diplomatic conference a number of
studies were undertaken: the Department of Transportation made a
factual and legal study of shipping since the advent of containers;65
the Bill of Lading Committee of the Maritime Law Association of the
United States divided the draft Convention among five sub-commit-
tees, each of 5 or more members, to study and report on the text;66
and the Department of Commerce produced a study to determine
actual values per kilogram, per pound and per package in United
States export trade (through the export declarations) and import
trades (through the Customs receipts) with the use of the computers
of the Census Bureau. 67
63G.A. Res. A/31/100.
64See Official Records, supra note 60.
65Dept. of Transportation, Cargo Liability Study, June, 1975 (Report No. YS-32004; Office
of Facilitation of the Office of Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Consumer
Affairs).
66Special Report of the Bill of Lading Committee on the UNCITRAL Draft of New Rules for
the Carriage of Goods by Sea, March 11, 1977, submitted to the Annual Meeting, May 4, 1977;
summary in MLA Doc. No. 604, at 6630-6636. In view of the subsequent hostility of MLA to
the Hamburg Rules, it should be noted that the sub-committee was divided on the question of
retention of the negligent navigation defense and no position was taken thereon.
67The Dept. of Commerce Study of United States Export and Import Values in Ocean
Transport 1974-1976 was submitted as Conference Documents U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/C.1I/
L47 and L131. (Note: At the time of the preparations for the Hamburg Rules the Maritime
Administration was still within the Department of Commerce. The Department of Transporta-
tion did not acquire responsibilities in ocean shipping legislation until a 1981 reorganization.)
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THE "PACKAGE DEAL" OF THE HAMBURG CONFERENCE
The United States suggested at an early stage the necessity of a
"Package Deal" involving Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the UNCITRAL
Draft, stressing the trade-offs which would be necessary to achieve a
logically consistent yet economically feasible compromise.68 There-
after, a number of delegations spoke in favor of the package deal
concept, accordingly, the core articles would be negotiated together
instead of independently of one another as had initially occurred
when the first four substantive articles of the draft Convention
consumed the first week. The Chairman of Committee One, Professor
Mohsen Chafik of Egypt, proposed to appoint a special "Package
Deal" Committee of fourteen of the seventy-eight attending nations
to negotiate articles 5, 6 and 8 and report back to Committee One. 69
After several days of negotiation by the Group of Fourteen, there
had still been little movement except to restate previous positions.
Consequently, Chairman Chafik requested a smaller group of five, the
Netherlands, U.S.S.R., Mexico, Norway, and the U.S., to advise the
chairman of the structure of an eventual compromise.70 The Nether-
lands and U.S.S.R. proposed retention of nautical fault, an amended
but weaker fire defense, and unbreakable limits. Mexico proposed no
nautical fault, a vastly weaker fire defense, and a new vague com-
promise on unbreakability. Norway proposed that since the strongest
views had been expressed respecting only two parts of the package,
nautical fault and unbreakability, those could be traded off so that
nautical fault would be removed as a defense but with a formula for
unbreakable limits.71 The U.S. followed through on the Norwegian
proposal with a suggestion of 3 SDR per kilo if the nautical fault and
6Official Records, at 166.
The author has described the package deal negotiations in cable reports to the Department
of State and the Delegation Report to the Secretary of State, dated February 5, 1979
(recommending signature), and in lectures in New York, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, New
Orleans, San Francisco, Halifax and Vancouver. He has also described the process in:
Sweeney, Article 6 of the Hamburg Rules, in The Hamburg Rules, supra note 55, at 151, and
Sweeney, Les Regles de Hambourg: Point de Vue d'un Juriste Anglo-Saxon, 31 Droit Maritime
Frangais 323 (June, 1979), and Sweeney, La Politica de distribucidn de Riesgos en el
Transporte Maritimo de Mercancias, Univ. Nac. Autonoma de Mexico, Estudios Juridicos en
Memoria de Roberto L. Mantilla Molina 769 (1984).69See Official Records at 82, paragraph 49.
70See Official Records at 173, paragraph 82.71The unbreakable limit formula (Art. 8) was adopted from the earlier work of CMI and
IMCO in the Athens Passenger Convention of 1974, 14 I.L.M. 945 (1975); 6 Benedict on
Admiralty, Doc. No. 2-2 (7th ed. 1990), and the London Limitation of Shipowners' Liability
Convention of 1976, 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 5-4 (7th ed. 1990). The United States
is not a party to these conventions.
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fire defenses were removed, but the limits were to be unbreakable.
The U.S.S.R. refused to discuss the 3 SDRs and the U.S.S.R. and the
Netherlands proposed a 1.5 SDR limit, but insisted that the fire
defense remain unchanged. Eventually, the U.S. proposed 2.75 SDRs
with no nautical fault or special fire defense. A counter proposal of
2.6 SDR limit with no nautical fault, but with the existing UNCI-
TRAL fire defense followed.
Finally, agreement was reached on 2.5 SDRs with a complex fire
defense, (Article 5(4)), no nautical fault defense, and unbreakable
limits (Article 8).72 Respecting the subsidiary issue of the unit limit for
delay damage, the debate returned to the Committee of fourteen
where many diverse proposals concentrating on connecting the delay
damages to some part of the freight were raised. The U.K. and the
U.S.S.R. proposed that the limit of liability be the freight on the
goods delayed. The U.S. and Norway proposed the entire contract
freight. Mexico proposed three times the freight on the goods
delayed. Poland proposed twice the freight on the goods delayed, but
not to exceed the total contract freight. There were other variations,
but, as with the principal unit limit proposals, both the economic
justification and the consequences of the proposals were uncertain.
After further inconclusive debate, Chairman Chafik resolved the
impasse with a proposal utilizing the 2.5 SDR per kilo compromise of
the Group of Five so that the new limit for delay damages would be
two and one half times the freight on the goods delayed, but not more
than the total contract freight. 73
From the point of view of the United States delegation, the
instructions of the Department of State had been achieved; most
importantly in the amount of unit limitation of liability, since 98.5% of
United States maritime exports by weight and 99.4% of United States
maritime imports would have been fully covered by the 2.5 SDR per
kilo amount. 74
At the last substantive session of the conference, the United States
made an interpretation, not challenged, to the effect that the Article
6 special delay rule does not apply to physical deterioration of the
goods because of delay but only to consequential economic losses.75
The Article 6(1) figure applies to physical deterioration.
7Official Records at 173, paragraph 82; and at 349-352, paragraphs 21-62.
73See Official Records, at 350. There is, of course, no logical connection between 2.5 SDR
per kilo and two and one half times the freight. The explanation is not logic but exhaustion.
74See note 67, supra. The Percentages of coverage by value would be less, 70.4% of exports
and 81.9% of imports.
7 5See Official Records, at 174, paragraph 101.
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The final vote on the entire text of the new convention came at
midnight on March 30, 1978. Under the Rules of Procedure for this
Conference, customarily adopted for all United Nations Conferences,
an affirmative vote of two thirds of the states present is necessary for
the adoption of a text. 76 The Hamburg Rules were adopted by
sixty-eight states in favor, none opposed and three abstentions of the
seventy-eight states present at the Conference. 7 The text of the Final
Act was signed on Friday, March 31, 1978. The text was to be open
for signature until April 30, 1979.78 No time limit for entry into force
was adopted and the number of mandatory ratifications was twenty
without reference to tonnage of merchant fleet or volume of interna-
tional trade, thus the Hamburg Rules will come into force one year
after the deposit of the twentieth ratification. 79
The positive reasons for the adoption of the Hamburg Rules are the
versatility of its concept of contract of carriage by sea instead of the
bill of lading;80 the equity in carrier responsibility while the goods are
in the charge of the carrier instead of the artificial exclusion of periods
other than the ocean voyage;81 the rationality of the liability regime,
free of the policy based defenses of negligent navigation and manage-
ment and the impossible burdens of proof imposed on parties without
primary access to information;8 2 and the certainty of the financial
limits of liability regardless of the situs of the proceedings. 83
I wish I could say that after all the time and money spent on the
Hamburg Rules that they are perfect. They are not, but I believe that
whenever conflicting economic interests must be compromised, the
76See Official Records, at XVIII-XXIH; Rule 33.
77See Official Records, at 189.
78Hamburg Rules, Art. 28(1).
The statements in Maher and Maher, Marine Transport, Cargo Risks and The Hamburg
Rules-Rationalization or Imagery, 84 Dickinson L. Rev. 183 (1979), to the effect that U.S.
signature was "peculiar," "most curious," and "tainted" are not correct. A Committee of
Legal Adviser's Office lawyers recommended signature. The Legal Adviser disagreed on policy
grounds, but Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, acting in the absence of the
Secretary, disagreed with Legal Adviser Hansell and ordered the Hamburg Rules to be signed
before expiration of the period for signature.
The signatory states as of April 30, 1979, the last day for signature in accordance with Art.
28(1) were: Austria, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, Ghana, Holy See, Hungary, Madagascar, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, United States of
America, Venezuela and Zaire. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/325.
79Hamburg Rules, Article 30(1).
8oId. Article 2(). See notes 35 supra and 105 infra.
811d. Article 4.
8Id. Article 5.
831d. Article 6.
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resulting structure must be inelegant and shaky. I do not see how the
results could be noticeably improved in the foreseeable future by
another conference. Sometime after the Hamburg Rules shall have
come into force, it may be possible to revise some of the more
infelicitous provisions in a new spirit of compromise.
The Hamburg Rules were built on all the sound work of the past,
especially the Hague Rules of 1924 and the Visby Amendments of
1968. The Hamburg Rules are not concerned with multimodal trans-
portation, yet they made the negotiation of the multimodal treaty84
and the terminal operators' liability treaty85 much easier than would
have been the case if the Hague Rules with their privileged position
of carriers had continued to be the glaring exception in international
transport law.
The Hamburg Rules finally accommodated the container revolution
of the post war period, but the delegates at Hamburg (or their
governments) were not ready to accommodate the rapid changes in
financing and documenting international sales which are being felt
right now. 86
STRUGGLE TO RATIFY HAMBURG
The failure of ratification of the Hamburg Rules since 1978 to this
date does not mean that there was paralysis in the effort. There has
been much activity and at least seven aspects in the struggle can be
identified.
A. Search for Hard Data on Economic Questions.
The shot-gun attack on Hamburg had asserted as economic cer-
tainty that adoption of the new Rules would necessarily lead to higher
costs, beyond inflation, both in the short term and in the long run.8 7
84See note 51 supra.
85The UNCITRAL Plenary approved the Draft Convention on the Liability of Terminal
Operators in International Trade in June, 1989. See U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 152/5. By UN G.A. Res.
44/33 of Dec. 4, 1989 the General Assembly approved the draft and called a diplomatic
conference to consider the draft convention for April, 1991. The conference adopted a modified
text, which is now open for signature. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 152113 of 18 April 1991.
86
"Writing" is defined to include telegrams and telex (Article 1(8)). No provision for the
replacement of physical documents by equivalent electronic data interchange messages (EDT)
is made. Cf. OTT Convention, note 85 supra, Art. 4(3).
8TMoore, The Hamburg Rules, 10 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1978); Chandler, A Comparison of
COGSA, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules, 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 233, 237 (1984).
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Contrary arguments were made, less assuredly, that Hamburg must
result in lower costs for shippers since double insurance on the same
risk would be eliminated.88 After five years of futile searches for
reliable data the effort to resolve the economic argument had to be
abandoned. Neither economic proposition is provable to its opposi-
tion, and the economic situations of both the maritime industry and
marine insurers are sufficiently troubled and unique so that past
changes in law do not provide useful analogies.
Furthermore, vessel liability insurance is dominated by mutual
associations of shipowners, the P&I Clubs, for which rate structures
can be highly individualized, and also dependent on fierce competi-
tion, fleet size and claims experience. 89
B. Carrier Opposition
As at the Hamburg Conference itself, carrier opposition to any
changes from the Hague-Visby regime has not diminished. Ship
operations are always risky and profits may suddenly be devoured by
unexpected emergencies so that the carriers can see no reason to
change from a familiar legal system, where risks can be easily
classified, to a new one, even though that new system is already well
known to air, road and rail transport. 90 Thus, carriers predict that all
cases dealing with the cause and effect of cargo damage over the past
50 years will be relitigated under the new reversed burden of proof.91
Given the volume of decided cases under COGSA and the other
modes of transportation, it is problematic that courts in the United
Almost all the economic arguments made after the Hamburg Conference were made and
answered in a lively session of the Conference itself, reported in Official Records at 233-239.
8SHellawell, Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 357,
363 et seq. (1979) discussing elimination of "friction" costs. See also O'Hare, Allocating
Shipment Risks and the UNCITRAL Convention, 4 Monash Univ. L. Rev. 117 (1978).
89An UNCTAD study regards increases in carriers' costs (and thus, directly, shippers' costs)
as probably negligible, The Economic and Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of
the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Transport Convention, UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/C.41315 (1987), following the reasoning of Professor Selvig of Oslo University in
Selvig, The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice, 12 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 299 (1981). See also Katz, Uniformity of International Trade Law and Economic Interest:
The Case of the Hamburg Rules, 1989 Diritto del Commercio Internazionale 103.
9°Comitd Maritime International, Colloquium on the Hamburg Rules, Vienna, January 8-10,
1979. (Chairman, Lord Diplock)
91See generally, Diamond, The Hague-Visby Rules, (1978) Lloyd's Mar. & Com. L.Q. 225;
Moore, The Hamburg Rules, 10 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1978); Yancey, The Carriage of Goods;
Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1238 (1983).
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States, armed with the new powers of Rule 11 sanctions, 92 will permit
carriers and their insurers to reinvent the wheel.
Carriers seek to justify the negligent navigation defense as essential
to risk allocation because cargo damage risks are not concentrated on
one source of funds, but are spread about the entire society. While
the spreading of risks is the rationale behind insurance at Lloyd's by
many syndicates, it may be inefficient in the maritime industry at
large, where insurance is simply a cost of doing business.
It should be noted that P&I Clubs have not been vocal supporters
of the Hamburg Rules even though the addition of risks the carrier
must bear would seem to benefit such insurers by the transfer of risks
(and premiums) from the cargo insurer. The reason lies in the nature
of the Clubs as non-profit mutual societies made up of shipowners
whose views are shared by the administrators of the Clubs.
C. Opposition of Cargo Insurers
Given the nature of the combatants in the usual cargo damage
dispute: P&I Clubs representing the carrier, and traditional insurance
companies insuring the cargo from warehouse to warehouse, it might
be assumed that cargo insurers might favor the Hamburg Rules
because the subrogated rights of shippers would eventually produce
greater returns for them. This is not the case. Apparently individual
claims are seldom set off by cargo insurers and P&I and Hull insurers,
but groups of claims may be used to wash out other groups of claims
in reconciliation negotiations. Cargo insurers have been consistent
opponents of any change from the familiar Hague-Visby regime. 93
This anomaly may be explained as coming from fear that transfer of
operational risks from shipper to carrier would be the beginning of an
avalanche of rejection of cargo insurance-the fear of cargo insurers
that customers will ask, "Why do I need cargo insurance? Why not
self-insurance?" The answer, of course, is that cargo insurance
protects shippers against unit limitation of liability, 94 global limitation
92Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation, 67
N.C.L. Rev. 1023 (1989); Note, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Duty
to withdraw a baseless pleading, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 697 (1988), and Vairo, Rule 11: A critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).
93See generally, Donovan, The Hamburg Rules: Why a New Convention on Carriage of
Goods by Sea, 4 Mar. Law. 1 (1979), and Chandler, A Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby
Rules and The Hamburg Rules, 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 233 (1984).
94Hamburg Rules, Art. 6; Hague Rules Art. IV(5); COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5).
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of liability,95 general average and salvage claims and other unex-
pected charges. Such insurers feel that these instances of carrier
non-liability will not fully sustain the existing premium structure of
cargo insurance. They are probably correct to the extent that cover-
ages are reduced.
D. The Trigger Controversy and the ABA
Since the Lloyd's of London Press Conference in November, 1978,
suggestions have been made for a compromise between Hague-Visby
and Hamburg. 96 Since the United States was not a signatory to the
Visby Amendments and since it appeared as though it might be
several years before the Hamburg Rules would enter into force, it
seemed logical for there to be a compromise whereby the United
States would ratify the Visby Amendments immediately and simul-
taneously ratify the Hamburg Rules, such ratification to become
effective at some time after the Hamburg Rules shall have come into
force. As with many compromises, mistrust of each protagonist by
the other made the provisions extraordinarily complex. Thus, pro-
posals were made for ratification to follow after the greater number of
our trading partners shall have ratified; or ratification to follow within
a definite number of years after the treaty would be in force,
regardless of the number of trading partners. Only the first of these
alternatives-called the "Trigger"-was acceptable to proponents of
Hague-Visby and Hamburg. Further provisions were drafted to
ensure that preselected criteria would be used which would eliminate
controversy as to the percentages of United States foreign trade, by
volume, being carried by Visby nations and Hamburg nations.
With the cooperation of the Departments of State and Transporta-
tion and hard bargaining with shippers, cargo insurers, carriers and
P&I Clubs and their trade associations, it was possible to put together
a proposal for the simultaneous ratification of both Visby and
Hamburg, although the Treaty Section of the State Department had
substantial reservations about such conditional advice and consent by
the Senate. The negotiations required almost two years to complete
and the proposal was eventually approved unanimously by the
Carriage of Goods Committee of the Maritime Law Association of the
95Note 71 supra. The 1851 United States' limitation of shipowners' liability act is codified at
46 U.S.C. § 180-89 (1988).
9LIoyd's of London Press, The Speakers' Papers for the Bill of Lading Convention
Conference, November 29-30, 1978.
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United States for presentation to the Association at its May 6, 1983
meeting. 97 The proposal, however, was rejected by the entire asso-
ciation, chiefly due to the opposition of cargo insurers and there has
been little interest in it since then.
No serious negotiations between the opposing groups can occur
until the Hamburg Rules are in force. Supporters of Hague-Visby
now know that efforts in support of Visby will be vigorously chal-
lenged by shippers while supporters of Hamburg know that the
opposition is powerful and united.
Because of the 1983 rejection of the "Trigger," attention turned
briefly away from the Maritime Law Association of the United States
to the American Bar Association in 1986 and 1987. This proved to be
just as frustrating to carriers and shippers as the "Trigger" contro-
versy and has not led anywhere due to the unwillingness of the
government to submit any proposal to the Senate which is not fully
supported by the private sector. The Section of International Law
and Practice of the ABA produced a compromise that satisfied no
one, in that the ABA endorsed98 immediate ratification of the Visby
Amendments with conditions: a) use of the liability limits of the 1980
Multimodal Convention: $920 per package or $2.75 per kilo; b) elim-
ination of the negligent navigation defense; c) imposition of liability
on multimodal carriers when identification of the precise source of the
damage cannot be made; and d) ensuring that stevedores are entitled
to the same limited liability as carriers. (The last provision seems to
be acceptable to shippers and carriers and their insurers and is no
longer controversial.) The ABA conditions would be achieved con-
temporaneously either by unilateral action of the United States or
multilateral treaty. The problem with these conditions is that for
unilateral action the United States would have to denounce the Hague
Rules while ratifying Visby, a step not conducive to international
uniformity. The other multilateral alternative would be for the United
States to sponsor and convene an international conference to attempt
to meld Hague-Visby with Hamburg and the 1980 Multimodal Con-
vention. The problem with such a "solution" is that it is approxi-
mately what the seventy-eight nations attempted to do at Hamburg in
1978, with the resulting inelegant and shaky compromises. It does not
seem to this observer (who favors the Hamburg Rules) that as long as
governments must be involved in treaty negotiations the result of a
new conference could be any different from the Hamburg Rules.
9MLA Doc. No. 647, at 7686-7700.
98ABA House of Delegates Resolution, Aug. 12, 1987.
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It is also unlikely that the United States will attempt to meld
Hague-Visby with Hamburg after an unsuccessful effort to achieve a
compromise at a Department of Transportation Symposium in Wash-
ington D.C. on October 20, 1988. 99 The sad truth is that carriers, their
insurers and the cargo insurers will not yield an inch on the Hague-
Visby system and shippers are adamantly opposed to Visby unless it
surely leads to Hamburg-a classic stalemate which has produced
governmental inaction until the maritime industry can solve its own
problems.
Without the United States effort proposed by the ABA, the only
possibility of achieving a reconciliation through negotiation remained
with the CMI, but that avenue appears to have been closed at the
June, 1990 Paris Plenary. 100
E. The Shippers' Alliance and the United Nations
It took several years to persuade shippers that mere approbation of
the Hamburg Rules would not bring about ratification. The shippers
would have to organize and use strategy and tactics to obtain change
similar to that which carriers had been using to maintain the status
quo. It was also necessary to change the same attitude of detachment
in UNCTAD1ol and UNCITRAL.102
With the evidence of effective lobbying against Hamburg by
shipowners, P&I Clubs and cargo insurers, shippers who were
organized under the Shippers National Freight Claim Council and the
National Industrial Traffic League began a campaign to procure
United States ratification of the Hamburg Rules and, eventually, the
1980 UNCTAD Multimodal Transport Convention.
Beginning in mid-1986 an alliance developed among the American
shippers' organizations and the British Shippers' Council, the Euro-
pean Shippers' Council--consisting of shipper organizations in Bel-
gium, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland-the Canadian
"Department of Transportation Symposium, Washington D.C., October 20, 1988. (The
report of this conference has never been published.)
10°See note 108 infra.
l0t Study of the Economic and Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of the
Hamburg Rules, UNCTAD Secretariat, UN Doc. No. TD/B/C.4/315. See also, Measures
Towards the Implementation of Conventions, UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/B/C.4302.
102See United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (Hamburg),
UNCITRAL Secretariat, U.N. Doc. AICN. 9/306 of 19 Feb. 1988. An UNCTAD document
prepared by Prof. Rolf Herber of the University of Hamburg makes the historical, legal and
equitable arguments in favor of the Hamburg Rules. See UN Doc. TD/B/C.4/315 Part I (Dec. 31,
1987). Prof. Herber was the President of the Hamburg Rules Conference.
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Shippers' Council, Australian Shippers' Council, Japanese Shippers'
Council, Hong Kong Shippers' Council and Korean Shippers' Coun-
cil. These groups organized the World Shipper Councils for Hamburg
Alliance in mid-1987.
On June 1, 1987 in Geneva, an informal meeting of invited groups
from the shipping industry convened under the auspices of the
International Chamber of Commerce and UNCTAD. The groups
involved were the U.S. Shippers' National Freight Claim Council, the
Australian Shippers' Council, the International Shipowners' Associ-
ation (INSA), the International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI), the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the CMI, the Baltic and
International Maritime Committee (BIMCO) and the Council of
European and Japanese Shipowners' Associations (CENSA). With
such a combination of shippers and carriers there could never be
immediate agreement. Technological change in the industry-espe-
cially the movement to eliminate the paper bill of lading-was
prominent in the Geneva discussion. Furthermore, it seemed that in
the future the united opposition of shippers might prevent any further
accessions to the Hague-Visby Rules. 0 3 The uncertain element in the
discussions was how long it would be before the Hamburg Rules were
in force.
The stalemate of shipper-carrier blocs cannot lead to the goal of
uniformity of maritime law without the lobbying of UNCTAD and
UNCITRAL, at least until the minimum number of ratifications,
twenty, is assured. Thereafter, the presence of Hamburg as the third
regime of risk allocation will have to be taken account of in industry-
wide planning, thus, in the fierce competition between carriers,
shippers and charterers may demand the Hamburg alternative, and it
is likely that those states which have indicated that they will ratify the
Hamburg Rules once they are in force will promptly do so. 104
F. Elimination of the Paper Bill of Lading
In the late 1980's, shippers, carriers, and the CMI became con-
cerned about technical developments with regard to paperless trans-
103See Katz, New Momentum towards Entry into Force of the Hamburg Rules, 24 European
Transport Law 297 (1989).
° lThe following states have ratified as of October 7, 1991: Barbados, Botswana, Burkina
Faso (formerly Upper Volta), Chile, Egypt, Guinea, Hungary, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, U. Rep.
Tanzania, and Zambia. In accordance with Article 30 (1), the treaty will enter into force on
November 1, 1992.
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actions by electronic data processing. The truth is that industry
demands multi-modal carriage from warehouse to warehouse under
modem methods and the failure of carriers, government and the legal
profession to accommodate this need is a source of great frustration
to shippers of all kinds. The recurrent problem, however, is the
requirement of the Hague Rules that there must be a bill of lading for
the international convention to be applicable.10 5 This stumbling block
of Hague is overcome in the Hamburg Rules which apply to all
contracts of carriage by sea 06 and not merely to bills of lading.
Concern over the necessity for bills of lading would seem to push the
CMI towards a third protocol to the Hague Rules to eliminate the
requirement, an effort which the CMI would not contemplate without
support of U.N. organs such as IMO, UNCTAD and UNCITRAL,
since the Belgian Government indicated in 1979 that it would no
longer call diplomatic conferences for the CMI.
The Hague draftsmen had intentionally designed the rules to
govern only the international ocean voyage, and one can speculate
that confining the documentary scope to bills of lading followed
naturally as the letter of credit (in which the on-board bill of lading
played a crucial role) had been developed as the most convenient
method of financing international trade. Regardless of the origin of
the bill of lading requirement, Hague-Visby is confined to the paper
bill of lading without a way to arrive at the paperless exchange of
electronic data demanded by modern commerce.
G. Comit6 Maritime International and the Conflict of Laws
An important factor in CMI thinking is the conflict of laws
problems which will emerge when the Hamburg Rules shall have
come into force. It would be devastating to all CMI efforts since 1897
on behalf of uniformity of maritime law to see carriers competing in
an over-crowded marketplace on the basis of whether the shipment
was subject to Hague Rules alone, Hague-Visby, Hague-Visby plus
the SDR Protocol, or the Hamburg Rules.
105See note 35 supra. The structure of the Hague Rules imposes duties, rights, responsibil-
ities, liabilities and immunities on Carriers, defined in Art. 1(a) as, "the owner or the charterer
who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper," but by Art. I (b) contract of carriage,
"applies only to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of
title. .. " (The French original reads, "conaissement ou tout document similaire formant
litre.") Cf. Art. VI and the proviso imposed in 46 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988).
106Hamburg Rules, Articles 1(6) and 2.
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In planning for the 1990 Plenary Meeting of the CMI in Paris, a
preliminary review of the risk allocation problem in Hague-Visby and
Hamburg was made in a meeting at Knokke-Le-Zout in Belgium. One
proposal was the drafting of a "Composite Text" which would
incorporate desirable provisions of the Hamburg Rules-by which
was meant non-controversial updating changes-into the existing
Hague-Visby-SDR Protocol text. (A study commissioned by the CMI
President 0 7 had looked into a number of problems unresolved by the
existing CMI texts and had found that the Hamburg solutions were
worthy of further study for the composite text.) Nevertheless, the
composite text was not to be, and the Paris Plenary failed to resolve
the emerging conflict of laws problems.108
CONCLUSION
For the past thirteen years debate has centered on comparing the
regimes of the Hague-Visby Rules and the proposed regime of the
Hamburg Rules, and my lecture delivered in Vienna in 1989, upon
which this article is based, was supposed to be part of that debate.
But the fact is that the maritime industry is moving away from paper
bills of lading, the cornerstone on which the Hague-Visby treaties are
built. Accordingly, the ship operators may resolve the debate, which
maritime lawyers have been unable to do, in favor of the Hamburg
Rules as the Hamburg Rules apply to all contracts of carriage by sea,
regardless of whether a bill of lading has been issued.
All of the bargaining and all of the debate has but one goal-to
make the law better and more responsive to the needs of international
commerce. I hope the Hamburg Rules have done that, and it is for
that reason that I recommend them for earnest study and eventual
support.
107CMI Documentation, UNIP-17, HI-90 (1990). Eight topics were selected for this study:
Identity of the carrier; Contracts and Documents; Deck Cargo; Period of Application;
Exemptions from Liability; Limits of Liability; Deviation; and Damages.
1°SRetention of the negligent management defense (abandoned in 1974) was recommended by
vote of sixteen delegations to twelve delegations (of the forty-eight member national associa-
tions). Retention of the negligent navigation defense was recommended by vote of twenty to
nine with four abstentions. See MLA Document No. 686, at 9712-3.
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